Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1953

Effie Cole v. Fred J. Kloepfer, Elden J. Kloepfer et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Newel G. Daines; M. C. Harris; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cole v. Kloepfer, No. 7897 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1818

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.·.·,~·,,·.~'·
',
\ . ~ .'
. . . . . \ \. \ . . I ..

'A.J ~'>
! .. '.
.

.();·~ i

,, '\.

~··.('. .

:·'

I

'

'

·,

i

In the Supreme ·Court
of.\lhe State of Utah ¥
•

.

_____

•':t
: .; \1 ,.
;_.

·~ -·

~~
_'

..

/
~

Effie Cole,
Plaintiff & Appellant, -

-vsFred J. Kloepfer, Elden J.
Kloepfer, and Ronald V.
Butters, doing business in the
Firm name of Kloepfer Sand &
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Cache.
Honorable I.Jewis Jones, District Judge
n.espectfully '~¥bn:litted,
NEWEL G. DAINE·S
~f. C. HA~RIS.
Attorneys for the Respondent
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• In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
- - - -----------

Effie Cole,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
-vsFred J. Kloepfer, Elden J.
Kloepfer, and Ronald V.
Butters, doing business in the
Firm nam~ of Kloepfer Sand &
Gravel ( o.,
Defendants & Respondents.

Case No. 7897

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent feels that is necessary to call to
the Court's attention the follovving additional facts:
The plaintiff was 71 years of age at the time of the
accident and 75 years of age at the time of the trial,
(R 34).

The \Vork complained of was performed in May,
.1947. (R 22) and the accident occurred in October, 1948.
Plaintiff lived near the place of the accident and traveled past the place at least once or twice a week bet\veen
the time the trench "Ta~ dug and the tin1e of the acciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
dent, (R 21).

The place looked hazardous and danger-

ous to the plaintiff when she first saw it.
many times what a hazardous. thing.

She said

She continually

observed the condition when she passed and many times
used to go around on the parking to go over, (R 35).
Plaintiff testified at R 40 as follows:
''And at first it was even. Well, it> went on a
year and a half, and naturally the elements.
the rain and everything, would sink the dirt
down in the gravel and that left a hazardous
place. I have said that many a time."
On the day of the accident, her eyesight was good.
She could see very plain. The sidewalk was dry. She
could see the cen1ent sticking up, (R 39). A car passed
in the street going fast. She heard some children
about a half a block down the street, ( R 41). Plaintiff
testified:
"I paused momentarily, just paused you know~
and when I seen the children were all right,
I proceeded on my vvay." .
On page 3 of Appellant's Brief is the following
statement:
"No permit, as was required by Logan City Ordinance, was taken out for the digging of the
trench as the record sho,vs no proof of thP
same." .
It is the respondents contention· that the burden of
proving that no permit vvas taken out was \Vas upon
the plaintiff, and the fact that the record fails to Rho\\'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a permit \Yas taken does not sustain the stateme~t
that no per1nit \Yas taken The respondents pleaded that
the pern1it \Yas taken out and would have been prepared
to prove that allegation had occasion required.

POINT 1
THE COI:RT PROPERLY RU.LED AS A MAT'rER OF l_j_A_ W TH_A_ T THE PLAINTIFF WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBlTTORY NEGLIGENCE.
POINT 2
THE COURT P R 0 PERL Y RULED THAT
THERE WAS NO E\TIDENCE OF ANY DUTY
OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE DEFEND_._<\NTS OR _._t\_NY ACTIOX OF NEGLIGENCE BY THE
DEFENDANTS vVHICH vV. t\_S
.
THE PRQXI1\fATI~
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDE~~T AND P·LAINTIFF'S
CONSEQlTENT INJl,-RY.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1 ·
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY THE P.LAINTIFF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE PL..:'\INTIFF'S NEGLIGENCF:
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND HER INJURY. THE TRIAL COUR'r
PROPERLY RULED THAT THIS CASE WAS CONTROLLED BY EISNER \'"S SALT LAKE CITY,
P'rAH, 238 Bacific Reporter, 2nd Series, page 416.
I~xcept

for the fact that the Eisner case was a n1uch
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stronger case for the plaintiff, the facts are very

similar.
''Plaintiff lived a few doors west of the defect and was familiar with it. She passed it t'vo
or three times a day and realized its danger,
having .declared that some time soinebodv \vould
·
be hurt.
Plaintiff was walking 'vest toward her home
at 10:30 a.m. on a sunshjny day when the accident occurred. There was no snow and the sidewalk was dry. Plaintiff 'vas aware that she was ·
in the vicinj ty of the hole. Her view of the defect was unobstructed. As she drew abreast
of the defect a large group of children (some 50
or 60) came along the sidewalk on their way to
to see a Santa Claus parade. The children were
not forrned in any mass cordon but were some\vhat spread out and dispersed. Not thinking about the depression but 'vith her eyes on the
children, plaintiff stepped aside into the depression._ In th fall her right wrist was broken.
~·

(1) That the degree of care which one must
exercise ,for his own safety is .a matter for the
jury generally is true. But the authorities seem
to hold that a pedestrian with prior knowledge
of a sidewalk defect and -an unobstructed daylight vie\v \vho steps into a visable ·defect is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, such
action falling short of standards attribute to the
reasonable prudent Inan. Most of the cases urged by plaintiff are distinguishable for various
reasons, inclq.ding an absence of prior kno,vledge
~f the· defect, that the injury occur']·ed at night,
or that the defect wa~ concealed by snow.''
In that case the plaintiff sought to excuse her con-·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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duct by temporary forgetfullness resulting from a distracted attention, \Yhich appears to be the appellant's
contention here. In ans,ver to this contention, this Court
is the Eisener case said:
'·Plainly. according to the authorities, the
cause diverting a pedestrian's attention from a .
known danger at least must be unexpected and
substantial; if it is not, the forgetfullness itself
rnay well constitute contributory negligence. It
cannot be said that such a principle is not based
on reason, since in every sidewalk case plaintiff
could sho'v that for one reason or another his
attention was distracted and he was inattentive
":rhen he should have been attentive, giving rise
to an action for .an injury which, absent such inattention, would not have resulted."
This case presents even a less e1nergency than the
the :Eisener case in that the car passing was out in thP
3treet and in no way endangered the plaintiff and the
children 'vere half_ a block \vay. There \vas no emergency; the plaintiff paused or stopped and then carelessly proceeded upon her way and fell. It would seen1
that this case is certainly no better than any other side-walk case "Then the plaintiff could always say that for
one reason or another her attention vvas distracted
and sh \vas inattentive 'vhen she should have been at-tentive. -If she had been attentive, the accident \Vould
•
never have occurred.
r:rhe cases apparently relied U})On by the appellant
were all rleeided before the case of Ejsner vs Salt Lake Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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City and were distinguished by this court in that case
and no useful purpose would .be served by asking the
court to review them again.

POINT 2
THE RECORD IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF AN\~
DlJTY OWING BY THE DEFENDANTS TO THE
PLAINTIFF.
The trench 'vas dug and fille~ one and a half years
before the accident. The duty to maintain the side-walks in the city 1s with the city and the property
owners.
Authorities:
Section 13-7.-7 6 l~ tah Code ~t\.nnota ted.
Salt Lake City vs Schubach 108lTtah 266 159 Pacific.
Second 149,
Head Note 1: ''A city is charged with duty, of
· maintaining sidew~lks within its limits in a safe
condition for use in the usual mode by pedestrians thereon.''
Bills vs Salt Lake City, 37 lTtah 507 109 Pacific 74;),
''The true test for the court to follow is that it
is. the duty of the city to exercise ordinary vigilance and care to detect defects in its streets and
to exercise ordinary care and reasonable diligence to re:rpove them, and to exercise the san1e
care to maintain its streets to the extent that
they have been opened for travel in a reaso1i.ably
safe condition for ordinary use and travel.''
idorris vs Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474 101 Pacifie
373,
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Head Note 8: "It is the primary duty of a city
to exercise reasonable care to maintain its streets
in a reasonably safe condition, and to guard
against injury to persons and property by making reasonably safe any dangerous objects in
the street, and this duty is constant and continuing and nondelegable.''
.A.pparently counsel recognized his difficulty in that
the objection of the city to n1aintain the sidewalks could
not have been delegated to the defendants; and at the
beginning at the trial attempted to ammend his contplaint to make out that the defendant had created a
public nuisance and appears to argue that the condition
of this sidewalk constituted a public nuisance.
The testimony of Mr. Sjoberg indicated that he went
to the city and inquired as to what he must do to have
the sewer and vvater put into his home; and he was
told that he had to have a licensed plumber do it·. l-Ie
hired Baugh Plumbing to do it. They took charge of
it from then on. Baugh Plumbing or the city told
Kloepfer where to dig, (R 56, 57). The defendants used
a bulldozer to fill the treneh and the trench was filled
about like a bulldozer would do it. It was sinooth in
some places and it other places it \vas made smooth.
The broken eement at one point stuck up about an inch
in the first place, and it settled some after that, (R 46).
A harricade was put up by a hole on the south side of
the side,valk to permit the city to install a meter on th•)
vvater pipe. The record is not clear vvhen the harrj_.
c·adP \VaH ren1oved or \Vhen tlle 1nrter was installed, hut
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eertainly there is no evidence that the condition created
by , these defendants constituted a public nuisance or
that these defendants owed any duty to maintain the
sidewalk or to fill in the slight depression resulting
from the settling over a period of a year and a half.
If this duty was ever on them, it is long since termin-ated; and it is not conceded that it was ever on them.
If a one inch depression in a sidewalk should be held
to constitute a public nuisance, then it is well known
by everybody that there are thousands of such public
nuisances in Inany comn1unities in this state; and the
Court was clearly right in saying that the plaintiff
had failed to establish any violation of any duty by this
defendant to this plaintiff at the time of this accident,
jn other words in ruling that the evidence -vvas insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the defendant or that such negligence was the proximate cause
~

of the accident.

CONCL r~SION
The ruling of the Court \Vas right that the evidenc(•
established the plaintiff \vas guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant which
was the proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff\;
resulting injury.
Respectfully

~ulHnitted,

Nl1JWEL G. DAINES
M. C. HARRIS
Attorneys for the Respondent
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